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are  again  in  full  en~plojwenf  at  ample  mages. 
THOW%  ATTWOOD  (1819) 
Mr.  Attwood  opines,  that  the  multiplication  of 
the  circulating  p>zedEClizlm,  and  the  consequent  di- 
n&&ion  of its value,  do not  wzerely ditninislz  the 
pressure  of  taxes  and  debts,  and  other  fixed 
charges,  but  give  en@oy+newt  to  labor,  and  fhaf 
to  an  indefinite  extent  .  .  .  .  Mr.  Attwood’s 
error  is  that  of  supposing  that  a depreciation  of 
the  currency  really  increases  the  demand  for  all 
articles,  and  conseqztently  their  prodlrction,  be- 
cause,  zcnder sogme circumstances,  it  nzay  create 
a false  opinion  of  an  increase  of  depnand;  which 
false  opinion  leads,  as tlze reality  would  do,  to an 
increase  oj  production,  followed,  however,  by  a 
fatal  revulsion  as  soon  as  the  delusion  ceases. 
JOHK  STUART  MILL  (1833) 
Accompanying  the  current  recovery,  now  well  into 
its  third  year,  is  a  heated  debate  over  the  role  of 
monetary  policy  in  restoring  and  maintaining  eco- 
nomic  stability.  Two  groups  of participants  dominate 
the  debate,  namely  advocates  of  activist  expansionary 
policies  at  one  extreme  and  proponents  of  steady 
monetary  growth  at  the  other.  The  policy  views  of 
these  competing  groups  have  been  conveniently  sum- 
marized  by  Professor  Karl  Brunner  [ 131.  himself  a 
member  of  the  stable  money  group. 
According  to  Brunner,  the  activist  group  (1 j  as- 
signs  top  priority  to  the  speedy  return  to  full  em- 
ployment,  (2)  urges  rapid  mone!  growth  to  help 
achieve  that  objective,  (3)  prescribes  monetary  fine- 
tuning  to  maintain  full  employment  once  it is reached, 
and  (4)  recommends  acceptance  of  inherited  infln- 
tion  on  the  grounds  that  the  cost  of  accepting  it  is 
far  less  than  the  cost  of  eradicating  it.  The  stable 
money  group,  by  contrast,  (1)  attaches  top  priority 
to  the  elimination  of  inflation  on  the  grounds  that 
price  stability  is  an  essential  prerequisite  for  an  effi- 
ciently  functioning  economy  and  a  sustained  high 
average  level  of  employment,  (2)  recommends  that 
the  monetary  authority  gracluaily  approach  and  there- 
after  permanently  adhere  to  a  target  path  of  money 
growth  consistent  with  a  zero  rate  of  inflation,  (3) 
prescribes  that  discretionary  fine-tuning  be  replaced 
by  fixed  monetary  rules,  in  particular  the  noninfla- 
tionary  constant  money  growth  rate  rule,  and  (4j 
warns  that  the  social  cost  of  accepting  inherited 
inflation  far  exceeds  the  cost  of  eradicating  it. 
The  debate  between  policy  activists  and  stable 
money  proponents  is  not  new.  The  essentials  of  the 
debate  can  be  traced  back  more  than  140  years  to  a 
celebrated  controversy  between  Thomas  Attwood  and 
John  Stuart  Mill  over  gold  versus  paper  monetary 
standards  in  post-Napoleonic  war  Britain.  This 
debate  occurred  during  a  long  deflationary  period 
that  abruptly  succeeded  a  wartime  inflationary  boom. 
The  postwar  deflation  brought  severe  unemployment. 
industrial  stagnation,  and  economic  distress.  .Qt- 
wood,  a  Birmingham  banker  and  political  reformer, 
sought  to  relieve  rhe  distress  by  replacing  the  esist- 
ing  gold-based  currency  with  an  inconvertible  paper 
currency  geared  to  the  level  of  employment.  He  was 
opposed  by  Mill,  the  famous  philosopher-economist 
who,  as  a  leading  member  of  the  orthodox  British 
Classical  school,  defended  the  gold  standard  and 
dismissed  all  paper  currency  schemes  as  purely  in- 
flationary.  The  debate  centered  on  such  modern 
policy  issues  as  unemployment  versus  inflation,  rules 
versus  discretion,  and  the  benefits  and  costs  of  ac- 
cepting  and  eliminating  inflation.  This  article  es- 
amines  the  Attwood-Mill  controversy  and  shows  how 
similar  it is in essentials  to  the  current  policy  debate.’ 
Attwood’s  Views  Thomas  Attwood  was  the 
policy  activist  of  his  day.  He  advocateci  full  employ- 
ment  and  gently  rising  prices,  both  to  be  achieved  by 
monetary  fine-tuning.  He  stated  these  views  in more 
i The  literature  on  the  Attwood-Mill  debate  includes  the  references 
listed  at  the  end  of  the  article.  Reaardinr  Attwood’s  views.  see 
Checkland  r141.  Cony  115.  pp.  ~1-957.  Fetter  112,  pp.  vii-xxviii] 
Link  IIS,  PP.  6-351,  O’Brien  119,  PP.  164-53.  and  Viner  122.  pp: 
173.  1S6-r.  195,  199,  212-14,  2S91.  On  Mill.  see  Link  116,  pp.  14~~61 
168-72,  177-91.  The  present  article  draws  heaviiy  from  these  sources: 
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press  as  well  as  in  private  correspondence,  in  testi- 
mony  before  three  Parliamentary  committees,  and  in 
several  speeches  before  the  House  of  Commons 
where  he  served  as  representative  for  the  district  of 
Birmingham  from  1832  to  1839.  His  views  can  be 
organized  under  five  headings  corresponding  to  the 
central  themes  of his analysis.  These  include  ( 1)  full 
employment  as the  policy  goal,  (2)  primacy  of  mone- 
tary  policy,  (3)  feasibility  of  monetary  fine-tuning, 
(4)  benefits  of  price  inflation,  and  (5)  costs  of  price 
deflation. 
Full  Employment  as  Policy  -Goal  To  Attwood, 
full  employment  was  the  overriding  policy  goal. 
“Employment,”  he  said,  “is  a  right  which  a  good 
citizen  may  claim  of  his  country  without  any  kind  of 
degradation  or  obligation”  [4,  pp.  4.5-6, cited  in  16, 
p.  201.  He  reiterated  this  view  in  1832  in  his  testi- 
mony  before  the  Parliamentary  Bank  Charter  Cow 
wzittee.  When  asked  the  question: 
Do  you  consider  that  as  long  as  there  exists  a 
labourer  in  the  country  not  fully  employed,  an  in- 
creased  issue  of  currency  may  be  made  with  ad- 
vantage,  whatever  it  be? 
Attwood  replied  : 
As  a  general  principle,  I  think,  unquestionably, 
that  so  long  as  any  number  of  industrious  honest 
workmen  in  the  Kingdom  are  out  of  employment, 
supposing  such  deficiency  of  employment  not  to  be 
local  but  general,  I  should  think  it  the  duty,  and 
certainly  the  interest,  of  Government,  to  continue 
the  deureciation  of  the  currencv  until  full  emolov- 
ment  &  obtained  and  general  p;osperity  [9,  p.  467, 
cited  in  15,  p.  861. 
Elsewhere  he  stated  that  “the  first  and  most  impor- 
tant  duty  for  the  Legislature  to  attend  to,  is  to  take 
care  that  an  ample  demand  for  labor  is  restored  and 
maintained  throughout  the  country”  [ 11,  p.  171. 
Attwood  defined  full  employment  as  an  excess  of 
vacant  jobs  over  unemployed  people,  or,  as  he  put  it, 
“a  greater  demand  for  labor,  than  labor  can  possibly 
supply”  14,  p.  39,  cited  in  16,  p.  341.  This  excess 
vacancy  measure  also  provided  tlzc  criterion  of  an 
appropriate  quantity  of  money,  as  can  be  seen  from 
Attwood’s  statement  that  money  creation  “cannot  be 
said  to  be  carried  to  too  great  an  extent,  until  the 
general  demand  for  labor,  in all the  great  departments 
of  industry,  becomes  permanently  greater  than  its 
supply.  There  is  no  other  correct  measure  of  a  re- 
dundant,  or  deficient,  circulating  medium”  [ 10, cited 
in  14, p.  lo].  Thus  if  labor  is  in  excess  supply,  the 
money  stock  is  too  small  and  should  be  expanded. 
Its  expansion  should  he  continued  until  excess  de- 
mand  just  begins  to  develop  in  the  labor  market.  At 
this  point  the  correct  amount  of money  is in  existence 
and  expansion  should  therefore  cease.  Note  that  he 
explicitly  puts  an  upper  as  well  as  a  lower  bound  on 
the  appropriate  quantity  of  money.  Thus  he  states 
that  “Whenever  . , . the  money  of  a  country  is  suffi- 
cient  to call every  laborer  into  action,  upon  the  system 
and  trade  best  suited  to  his  habits  and  his  powers, 
the  benefits  of  an  increased  circulation  can  go  r> 
farther.  . .  .”  Beyond  that  point,  further  &crease  is 
“nugatory  or  injurious”  [2,  p., 68,  cited  in  22,  p. 
213n.l.  In  short,  hq_spec.,lc  ‘;“--d  a  .unique  ideal  money 
stock  target  consistent  with  full  employment. 
In  specifying  his  full  employment  target,  Attwood 
was  confronted  with  a  measurement  problem  created 
by  the  lack  of  employment  or  unemployment  sta- 
tistics.  He  tried  to  solve  this  problem  by  suggesting 
three  proxy  measures  of  full  employment.  These 
included  the  price  of  wheat  (a  crude  index  of  the 
cost  of  living),  the  wages  of  agricultural  labor  (Att- 
wood’s  “par  of  labor”)  and  the  rate  of  interest,  re- 
spectively.  He  assumed  that  full  employment  existed 
when  these  variables  reached  certain  levels.  Spe- 
cifically,  wheat  prices  at  15 shillings  a  bushel,  weekly 
wages  at  18 shillings,  and  interest  rates  at  5 percent 
spelled  the  existence  of full  employment.  Departures 
from  these  norms  indicated  corresponding  departures 
from  full  employment  and  the  need  for  monetary 
action.  Thus  lower  prices  and  wages  and  higher 
interest  rates  signaled  unemployment  and  the  need 
for  monetary  expansion.  Deviations  in  the  opposite 
direction  meant  overfull  employment  and  the  need 
for  monetary  contraction.  Attwood  assumed  that 
these  proxies  were  mutually  consistent  and  would 
not  produce  conflicting  signals  for  the  authorities. 
He  also  assumed,  in  effect,  that  employment  could 
be maintained  at the  desired  level  by  pegging  nominal 
wage,  price,  and  interest  rate  variables. 
Attwood’s  association  of  given  wage  and  price 
levels  with  a  given  level  of  employment  corresponds 
to  present-day  use  of  Phillips  curve  relationships  be- 
tween  inflation  and  unemployment.  Likewise,  as 
will  be  shown  later,  John  Stuart  Mill’s  criticism  of 
Attwood  on  this  point  is  similar  to  modern  criti- 
cisms  of  the  Phillips  curve.  Like  modern  critics  of 
the  Phillips  curve,  Mill  argued  that  one  could  not 
peg  real  economic  variables  by  pegging  nominal 
variables  (whether  wages,  prices,  interest  rates,  or 
the  money  stock)  since  there  exists  no  permanent 
relation  between  the  two  kinds  of  variables,  i.e.,  they 
are  independent  of  each  other  in  the  long  run.  Note 
also  that  Attwood’s  version  of  the  Phillips  curve 
referred  to  wage  and  price  levels  rather  than  to  the 
rate  of  inflation.  In  his  time  it  was  natural  to  think 
in  terms  of  a  stable  long-run  price  level,  with  low  or 
high  prices  corresponding  to  low  or  high  rates  of 
inflation  today. 
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with  full  employment.  Further  proof  that  full  em- 
ployment  was  for  him  the  desideratum  of  monetary 
policy  is  contained  in  his  discussion  of  conflicts  be- 
tween  the  goals  of  internal  and  external  equilibrium 
,.  ypder  the  gold  standard.  Regarding  the  objectives 
of  fu;!  anployment  and  convertibility  of  the  currency 
into  gold  a;  2 ,@ed  price,  Attwood’s  view  was  that 
the  former  should  .prez;ail. i  -In  fact,  if .full  employ- 
ment  proved  to  be  incompa?ible  .\+th  convertibility 
and  the  maintenance  of  fixed  exchange  rates,  then 
Attwood  was  prepared  to  sacrifice  the  latter  even  if it 
meant  the  complete  cessation  of  foreign  trade.  That 
is,  Attwood  was  quite  willing  to  replace  the  existing 
gold  standard  monetary  system  of  convertible  paper 
currency  and  fixed  exchange  rates  with  an alternative 
system  of nonconvertible  paper  and  flexible  exchange 
rates  if  full  ernploymenr  so  required.  Attwood  was 
one  of  the  first  to  argue  that  floating  eschange  rates 
could  provide  a  nation  with  the  autonomy  necessary 
to  control  its  own  money  stock  and  achieve  its  do- 
mestic  objectives  independent  of the  rest  of the  world. 
By  abandoning  fixed  exchange  rates  for  floating  ones, 
the  authorities  could  pursue  domestic.  employment 
targets  free  of  an  external  constraint.  As  he  put  it: 
under  floating  exchange  rates  the  nation  would  he 
“Self-existent,  self-dependent,  liable  to  no  foreign 
actions,  entirely  under  our  own  control;  contracting, 
expanding,  or  remaining  fixed,  according  as  the 
wants  and  exigencies  of  the  community  may  require” 
[7,  p.  341. 
Primacy  of  Money  Attwood  constantly  stressed 
the  importance  of  money  in  the  achievement  of  full 
employment.  His  analysis  invariably  linked  changes 
in  the  level  of  economic  activity  to  changes  in  the 
money  supply,  implying  that  the  latter  variable  is the 
dominant  determinant  of  the  former.  Prosperity,  he 
said,  “is  indeed  to  be  attributed  to  one  cause  only. 
and  that  cause  is  the  general  increase  of  the  Circu- 
lating  Medium”  [ 7: p.  121.  Similarly,  a  ‘%ontraction 
of  the  Currency”  is  “the  sole  cause  of  the  distress  of 
Agriculture,  and  of  all  other  distress”  [T,  p.  911.  It 
follows,  therefore,  that  “it  is the  deficiency  of  money, 
and  not  its  excess,  which  ought  most  to  be  guarded 
against,  which  produces  want  of  employment,  pov- 
erty,  misery,  and  discontent  in  nations!’  Ill,  p.  lS] . 
In  line  with  the  foregoing  precept,  he  prescribed 
monetary  injection  via  government  loans  and  open 
market  operations  or,  as  he  put  it,  “a  forced  creation 
of  additional  currency”  as  the  sole  remedy  for  unem- 
ployment  [ 1, p. 91.  He  specifically  rejected  two  non- 
monetary  remedies,  namely  David  Ricardo’s  capital 
levy  plan  and  William  Cobbett’s  “equitable  adjust- 
ment  of  contracts,”  both  designed  to  stimulate  eco- 
uomic  activity  by  reducing  the  burden  of  fixed  costs. 
To  Attwood,  nothing  but  monetary  expansion  would 
restore  prosperity.  Wothing,”  he  wrote,  “can  feed 
the  labourers,  nothing  can  serve  the  country,  unless 
it  has  the  effect  of  cre&zg,  or  bringing  into  action, 
an  additional  quantity  of  the  currency”  [I,  p.  383. 
He  also  viewed  money  growth  as  the  key  to  main- 
taining  prosperity  once  it  was  restored.  He  argued 
that  sustained  full  employment  required  a  money 
growth  rate  sufficiently  rapid  to  accommodate  the 
trend  growth  rate  of  capacity  output.  Gold,  he: 
thought,  could  not  grow  at  the  required  pace,  which 
is  one  reason  he  advocated  paper  over  gold.  With. 
paper,  there  would  be  no  shortage  of  money  to  limit. 
economic  growth.  To  summarize,  Attwood  stressed 
monetary  growth  as  the  solution  to  two  problems: 
that  of  moving  onto  the  full  employment  path  (i.e., 
the  short-run  problem  of  eliminating  cyclical  unem- 
ployment)  , and  that  of staying  on  the  path  (the  long- 
run  problem  of  maintaining  adequate  growth). 
Monetary  Fine-Tuning  Like  his  mode’rn  activist 
counterparts,  Attwood  believed  in  the  efficacy  of 
monetary  fine-tuning.  He  advocated  the  assignment 
of  monetary  management  to  a  legislative  commission. 
This  body  would  regulate  the  quantity  of  money  not 
by  adhering  to  rigid  “laws  of  maximum  and  mini- 
mum  but  by  judicious  legislative  operations  upon  the 
issue  of  bank  notes,  or  other  national  paper”  [3,  p. 
!63,  cited  in  22,  p.  2131.  The  economy  needed  to  be 
stabilized  and  effective  stabilization  called  for  dis- 
cretion,  not  rules.  For  example,  wise  and  skillful 
monetary  management  could  nulIify  shocks  to  full 
employment  arising  from  sudden  shifts  in  the  de- 
mand  for  money. 
In  case  of  any  sudden  panic  occurring,  so  as  to 
occasion  an  unusual  demand  for  money  .  .  .  the 
~~ozcowertible  &per  instantly  expands  itself  to 
meet  the  demand,  and  the  demand  is  satisfied  and 
the  mischief  stayed  [7,  p.  341. 
Similarly,  discretionary  fine-tuning  would  prevent 
the  overissue  of  money  and  the  acceleration  of  infla- 
tion  at  full  employment. 
When  public  confidence  runs  high  and  the  instru- 
ments  of  credit  have  a  tendency  to  expand  them- 
se!.ves into  excess,  the  slightest  touch  upon  the  ROYL- 
co?zvert&ilit~  basis  of  the  Circulation  instantly  re- 
duces  the  whole  [7,  p.  341. 
In  sum.  discretion  should  prevail  and  the  economy 
would  be kept  on an  even  keel  by  “a judicious  issuing 
and  withdrawing  of  the  banknote  circulation”  around 
the  full  employment  level  13,  p.  150,  cited  in  14. 
p.  101. 
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wood’s  writings  is  the  necessity  of  price  inflation. 
Price  increases  were  an  essential  ingredient  in  his 
full  employment  program.  “The  great  object  of  cur- 
rency  legislation,”  he  said,  “should  therefore  be  to 
secure  and  promote  this  gradual  depreciation”  of  the 
currency  [3,  p.  lOln.,  cited  in  14, p.  81.  To  this  end 
he  extolled  the  benefits  of  gently  rising  prices. 
Restore  the  depreciated  state  of  the  currency  and 
you  restore  the  reward  of  industry,  you  restore 
confidence,  you restore  production,  you restore  con- 
sumption,  you  restore  everything  that  constitutes 
the  commercial  prosperity  of  the  nation  [l,  p.  661. 
This  passage  shows  that,  for  Attwood,  inflation  is 
desirable  precisely  because  it  stimulates  economic 
activity.  The  rise  in  the  level  of  income,  output,  and 
employment  constitutes  the  benefits  of  inflation.  But 
what  is the  mechanism  or  linkage  involved,  i.e.,  ho=! 
does  the  stimulus  work?  According  to  Attwood,  it 
does  so  by  reducing  the  burden  of  real  fixed  costs 
thereby  raising  profits  and  profit  expectations  that 
provide  the  means  and  the  inducement  for  business 
expansion.  Specifically,  a  money-induced  increase  in 
aggregate  spending  bids  up product  prices  while  fixed 
costs  remain  constant  in  nominal  terms.  The  result- 
ing  spread  between  prices  and  costs  increases  current 
profits  and  leads  to  the  formation  of  optimistic  ex- 
pectations  of future  profits.  These  profits,  actual  and 
expected,  spur  production  and  employment.  Profits 
are  clearly  the  key  to  increased  economic  activity  and 
inflation  raises  profits  by  generating  a  gap  between 
prices  and  fixed  costs.  In  brief,  “there  is no difficulty 
in  employing  and  maintaining  labourers,  so  long  as 
the  prices  of  the  products  .  .  .  are  kept  above  the 
range  of  the  fixed  charges  and  nzonied  expenses,” 
i.e.,  so long  as business  is profitable  [7,  p. 42.  Italics 
in  original.].  This  point  is  further  emphasized  in 
Attwood’s  summary  of  the  money-price-profit-em- 
ployment  nexus.  “Prosperity,”  he  says,  has  occurred 
whenever  the  government  has 
filled  the  Country  with  what  is  called  Money;  and 
this  plenty  of  Money  has  necessarily  produced  a 
general  elevation  of  prices  ;  and  this  general 
elevation  of  prices  has  necessarily  produced  a 
general  increase  of  profit  in  all  occupations;  and 
this  xreneral  increase  of  nrofit  has.  as  a  matter  of 
course,  given  activity  to* every  trade  in  the  king- 
dom:  and  whilst  the  workmen,  in  one  branch  of 
trade,  are  producing  one  set  03  articles,  they  are 
inevitably  consuming  an  equal  amount  of  all  other 
articles.  This  is  the  prosperity  of  the  Country, 
and  there  is  no  other  prosperity  which  has  ever 
been  enjoyed,  or  ever  can  be  enjoyed  [7,  pp.  11-121. 
Costs  of  Price  Deflation  Finally,  Attwood  con- 
tinually  warned  against  the  evils  of  falling  prices.  In 
doing  so,  he  used  much  the  same  arguments  as 
modern  policy  activists.  The  only  difference  is  that 
modern  analysts  have  gone  one  derivative  beyond 
Attwood.  He  worried  about  the  harm  done  by falling 
prices.  They  worry  about  the  costs  of  a  falling  rate 
of  inflation. 
Like  his  current  activist  counterparts,  Attwood 
saw  the  harmful  effects  of deflation  as stemming  from 
institutional,  contractual,  and  expectational  -rigidities 
built  into  the  structure  of  product  and  factor  prices. 
These  rigidities,  he  thought,  worked  in  two  ways. 
First,  they  prevent  prices  from  adjusting  swiftly 
in  response  to  deflationary  pressures.  It  took  a  long 
time,  he  believed,  for  deflation  to  work  its  way 
through  the  price  structure.  During  this  time,  quan- 
tities  (output  and  employment),  not  prices,  had  to 
bear  the  main  burden  of  adjustment.  As  he  put  it,  to 
engage  in  deflationary  contractions  of  the  money 
supply  in an  economy  in which  “the  whole  machinery 
of  society  is  worked  through  the  medium  of  mone- 
tary  debts  and  contracts,  is  to  arrest  the  movement 
of  that  vast  and  complicated  machinery  [and]  to 
destroy  the  beneficial  employment  of  labor”  [ 11, 
P* 21. 
Second,  rigidities  produce  distortions  in  cost-price 
relationships.  These  occur  because  rigidities  are  not 
uniform  across  the  price  structure,  i.e.,  different 
prices  have  different  speeds  of  adjustment.  Spe- 
cifically,  wages  and  other  contractually  fixed  costs 
(“all  the  monied  incumbrances”)  adjust  sluggishly 
relative  to  product  prices.  Thus,  when  general  prices 
fall,  product  prices  fall  relatively  to  wages  and  fixed 
costs.  This  reduces  profits  which  constitute  the 
means  and  the  incentive  to  produce.  As  a  result 
economic  activity  slackens  and  unemployment  rises. 
These  effects  are  clearly  outlined  by  Attwood  in  the 
following  passage. 
If  prices  were  to  fall  suddenly,  and  generally,  and. 
equally,  in  al!  things,  and if  it was well understood, 
that  the  amount  of  debts  and  obligations  were  to 
fall  in  the  same  proportion,  at  the  same  time?  it  is 
possible  that  such  a  fall  might  take  -place  v&hout 
arresting  consumption  and  production,  and  in  that 
case  it  would  neither  be  injurious  or  beneficial  in 
any  great  degree,  but  when  a fall  of  this  kind  takes 
place  in  an  obscure  and  unknown  way,  first  upon 
one  article  and  then  upon  another,  without  any 
correspondent  fall  taking  place  upon  debts  and  ob- 
ligations,  it  has  the  effect  of  destroying  all  con- 
fidence  in  property,  and  all  inducements  to  its 
production,  or  to  the  employment  of  laborers  in 
any  way  [3,  pp,  78-9,  cited  in  22,  p.  186.  Italics  in 
original.]. 
Elsewhere  he  states  that  when  “the  prices  of  com- 
modities  are  suffered  to  fall  .  .  .  within  the  level  of 
the  fixed  charges  and  expenses  .  .  . the  industry  of 
the  country  dies”  [7,  p.  42.  Italics  in  original.]. 
In  short,  owing  to  rigid  cost  elements,  deflation 
leads  to  recession.  And  once  started,  a  recession  in- 
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Iieved  the  economy  to  be  unstable  in  a  downward 
direction.  Falling  prices  depress  profits  and  profit 
expectations  and  cause  an  unloading  of  stocks.  This 
puts  further  downward  pressure  on  prices,  profits, 
and  expectations  causing  another  unloading  of stocks, 
etc.  A  downward  multiplier  effect  takes  hoid  and  the 
cyciical  trough  is  not  reached  until  stocks  are  ex- 
hausted  and  prices  start  to  rise  because  of  shortages. 
This  sequence  brings  great  suffering  to  unemployed 
workers  and  hardship  to  businessmen.  For  these 
reasons,  price  deflation  shock?  be  avoided  at  all costs. 
Policy  Views  of  the  Classical  School  Attwood 
was  not  a  member  of  the  Classical  school.  Hi s 
policy  views  were  unorthodox  in  his  time.  But  his 
analytical  tools  were  largely  the  same  as  those  of  his 
CIassical  school  contemporaries.  From  them  he 
obtained  the  quantity  theory  of  money,  which  he  used 
in  expounding  the  relationship  between  money  and 
prices.  And  his  treatment  of  the  economic  effects  of 
inflation  derived  straight  from  David  Hume,  whose 
analysis  likewise  formed  the  central  core  of  the 
Classical  doctrine  of forced  saving  according  to  which 
inflation  temporarily  stimulates  activity  by  trans- 
ferring  wealth  from  unproductive  fixed-income  re- 
cipients  to  productive  capitalist  entrepreneurs.  The 
clash  between  Attwood  and  the  CIassical  school  was 
not  over  economic  analysis  or  theory,  Instead  it  was 
over  immediate  objectives  of  policy,  Attwood  iocus- 
ing  on  instant  full  employment  and  the  Classical 
economists  focusing  on  external  and  internal  stability 
of  the  value  of  money,  which  they  associated  with 
the  gold  standard.” 
The  Classicists  attached  great  importance  to  sta- 
bility  in the  value  of money,  regarding  it  as  an  essen- 
tial  prerequisite  for  justice  in  contracts  and  for  eco- 
nomic  growth  and  efficiency.  Without  this  stability, 
parties  to  contracts  would  be  exposed  to  arbitrary 
and  capricious  transfers  of  income  and  wealth  arising 
from  unforeseen  changes  in  the  value  of  money. 
Such  transfers  constituted  unjust  vioIations  of  con- 
tracts.  Likewise,  without  the  monetary  stability 
provided  by  the  gold  standard,  producers,  who  are 
already  heir  to  numerous  real  business  risks,  would 
face  additional  risks  arising  from  unanticipated 
changes  in the  value  of money.  These  additional  risks 
discourage  production  and  inhibit  reaI  economic 
2 The  Classicists  thought  that  gold,  for  all  its  vicissitudes,  was  a 
more  stable  standard  of  value  than  the  alternatives.  especially  paper. 
Ox  this  point,  see  Robbins  I21,  pp:  69-731.  They  maintained  that, 
given the  world  gold  stock,  re~sosonaole national  price  stability  wwld 
be  assured  under  the  gold  standard  by  the  operation  of  the  pricc- 
specie-f&m  mechanism.  That  is.  a  temporarv  rise  in  domestic 
prices  relative  to  for&n  prices  would  induce  a  balance  of  payments 
deficit  snd  a  corresponding  gold  outflow  that  aouid  reverse  the  price 
increase  and  restore  prices  to  their  initial  level. 
growth.  Moreover,  they  cause  real  resources-effort, 
time,  knowledge-to  be  diverted  from  productive 
pursuits  into  forecasting  and  risk-bearing  activities 
that  would  be  totally  unnecessary  if  money’s  value 
were  stable  and  predictable.  This  represents  a waste- 
ful  and  inefficient  use  of  resources  that  results  in  a 
lower  Ievel  of  output  than  the  economy  is  capable  of 
producing. 
As  the  preceding  suggests,  the  CIassical  econo- 
mists  were  not  obiivious  to  the  desirability  or’ full 
empioyment.  On  the  contrary,  they  were  very  much 
concerned  that  economic  resources,  including  labor, 
he  utilized  as  fuily  and  efficientIy  as  possible.  But 
they  believed  that  efficient  resource  utilization  (full 
employment)  could  best  be  achieved  not  by  making 
it  the  main  target  of  monetary  policy  but  by  estab- 
lishing  a  framework  of  preconditions  within  which  it 
could  flourish.  One  of  these  essentiaI  preconditions 
was  stability  (i.e.,  predictability  and  reliability)  of 
the  value  of  monev  - .  If  monetary  stability  prevailed, 
they  thought,  then  fu!I  employment  would  tend  to 
take  care  of  itself.” 
This  attitude  helps  espfain  their  opposition  to 
Attwood.  In  a  nutshell,  they  feared  that  his  schemes. 
by  making  fuII employment  the  desideratum  of  mone- 
tary  policy,  would  in  the  end  lead  to  conditions 
opposite  to  those  he  intended.  They  foresaw  the 
following  gloomy  sequence  as the  natural  consequence 
of  his  proposals:  internal  inflation,  esternal  disequi- 
librium  ancl  gold  drains,  exhaustion  of  the  nation’s 
gold  reserves,  abandonment  of  the  gold  standard  and 
of  convertibility  of  the  currency  (the  sole  check  to 
overissue),  hyperinflation.  and  eventually  economic 
breakdown  and  stagnation.  In  short,  they  felt  that 
his  infIationist  schemes  constituted  a  formula  for 
disaster. 
Mill’s  Critique  of  Attwood  Sowhere  is  the  Clas- 
sical  school’s  opposition  to  Attwood  more  strongly 
espressed  than  in  the  writings  of  John  Stuart  Mill. 
NiIl,  of  course.  was  a  leading  Classical  economist 
ancl  an  uncompromising  defender  of, the  gold  stan- 
dard.  His  comments  on  r1ttwood  appeared  first  in 
an  1533  article  entitled  “The  Currency  Juggle”  and 
later  in  Chapter  13  of  his  famous  treatise  Principlrs 
of  Politico!  Econow~  (1848). 
In  these  writings  he  attacked  Attlvood’s  full  em- 
ployment  proposals  on  at  least  three  grounds.  First, 
he  questioned  the  feasibility  of  attempts  io  peg  em- 
pIoyment  at  nrbitraril!  high  levels  yin  inflation. 
Second.  he  argued  that  even  if  inflation  could  stimu- 
3This  point  is  stressed  most  forcefully  by  O’Brien  119.  p.  165J  and 
Robbins  [ZO,  p.  13:  and  21,  p.  ‘il. 
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terms  of  its  effects  on  efficiency  and  equity.  Third, 
he asserted  that  monetary  policy  should  be conducted 
on  the  basis  of  rules,  not  discretion.  Mill’s  analysis 
of these  issues  is remarkably  modern  and  is described 
in  some  detail  in  the  following  paragraphs. 
Pegging  Output  and  Employment  Regarding  the 
feasibility  of  stimulating  activity  via  inflationary 
money  growth,  Mill  argued  as  follows.  First,  such 
stimulus  is at  best  temporary.  Second,  it  occurs  only 
when  inflation  is unanticipated  and  catches  people  by 
surprise.  Being  unexpected,  the  inflation  fools  or 
deludes  people  into  increased  activity  under  the  mis- 
taken  belief  that  real  profits  and  wages  have  risen. 
As  Mill  put  it,  inflation 
could  only  succeed  in  winning  people  on  to  these 
unwonted  exertions  by  a  prolongation  of  what 
would  in  fact  be a  delusion;  contriving  matters  so, 
that  by  a  progressive  rise  of  money  prices,  every 
producer  shall  always  seem  to  be  in  the  very  act 
of  obtaining  an  increased  remuneration  which  he 
never,  in  reality,  does obtain  [18, p.  5501. 
For  example,  suppose  there  occurs  an  unanticipated 
increase  in  nominal  aggregate  demand  that  drives  up 
general  prices.  To  each  producer,  the  inflation  ap- 
pears  as  an  unexpected  rise  in  the  demand  for  his 
product.  In  an  environment  in  which  changes  are 
always  occurring  in  the  relative  demand  for  different 
goods,  he will not  know  whether  this  change  is special 
to him  or  pervasive.  But  if inflation  has  not  occurred 
for  some  time,  he  will  likely  interpret  the  demand 
shift  as  special  to  himself  and  so  expand  output. 
Surprised  by  inflation,  he  will  misinterpret  the  gen- 
eral  price  increase  as  a  rise  in  the  relative  price  of 
his  own  product.  In  this  way  each  producer  will  be 
led  to  think  that  the  demand  for  his  product  has  in- 
creased  relative  to  the  demand  for  other  products. 
Consequently,  each  will  tend  to  expand  production 
and  aggregate  output  will  rise. 
That  this  was  Mill’s  interpretation  is clear  from  his 
statement  that  a  general  rise  in  nominal  demand 
“produced  a  rise  of prices,  which,  not  being  supposed 
to  be  connected  with  a  depreciation  of  the  currency 
[i.e.,  not  perceived  as  being  connected  with  general 
inflation],  each  merchant  or  manufacturer  considered 
to  arise  from  an  increase  of  the  effectual  demand  for 
his  article,  and  fancied  there  was  a ready  and  perma- 
nent  market  for  almost  any  quantity  of  the  article 
which  he  could  produce.”  In  short,  an  unexpected 
inflation,  “may  create  a  false  opinion  of  an  increase 
of  demand;  which  false  opinion  leads,  as  the  reality 
would  do,  to  an  increase  of  production”  [ 17,  p.  791. 
The  increase  in  ouput  of  course  requires  extra 
labor  which  employers  obtain  by  offering  higher 
nominal  wages.  The  labor  is  willingly  supplied  by 
workers  who  mistake  the  rise  in  nominal  wages  for 
real  wage  increases.  In  Mill’s  words,  “the  induce- 
ment  which  .  .  .  excited  this  unusual  ardor  in  all 
persons  engaged  in  production,  must  have  been  the 
expectation  of  getting  more  commodities  generally, 
more  real  wealth,  in exchange  for  the  produce  of their 
labor,  and  not  merely  more  pieces  of  paper”  [ 18; 
p.  5501.  Owing  to  inflation,  howe:Fer;  these  expecta- 
tions,  Mill  noted,  will  be  disappointed  and  subse- 
quently  revised  downward.  In  this  way  expectations 
will  adjust  to  reality,  i.e.,  the  inflation  eventually 
will  be  accurately  perceived  and  fully  anticipated. 
The  third  point  in  Mill’s  argument  is  that  the 
inflationary  stimulus  vanishes  when  perceptions  ad- 
just  to  reality,  i.e.,  when  producers  correctly  perceive 
demand  increases  as  nominal  rather  than  real  and 
workers  realize  that  real  wages  have  not  risen.  When 
this  happens,  economic  activity  reverts  to  its  original 
(preinflation)  level,  but  only  after  undergoing  a 
temporary  recession  to  correct  for  the  excesses  of 
the  inflationary  period.  In  other  words,  the  return 
to  equilibrium  involves  some  overshooting  and  a 
period  of  below-normal  activity.  Here  is  Mill’s 
conclusion  that,  when  people  are  fooled  by  inflation, 
economic  activity  is  affected  both  at  the  time  of  the 
misperception  and  also  when  the  misperception  is 
corrected.  As  Mill  expressed  it,  the  “increase  of 
production”  is  “followed  . .  . by  a  fatal  revulsion  as 
soon  as  the  delusion  ceases”  [ 17,  p.  791. 
Finally,  Mill  argued  that  Attwood’s  proposal  to 
peg  employment  via  inflationary  money  growth  as- 
sumed  the  existence  of  permanent  money  illusion,  an 
assumption  patently  at  odds  with  the  facts.  Att- 
wood’s  scheme,  he  says,  “calculates  on  finding  the 
whole  world  persistin, u  for  ever  in  the  belief  that 
more  pieces  of  paper  are  more  riches  and  never  dis- 
covering  that,  with  all  their  paper,  they  cannot  buy 
more  of  anything  than  they  could  before.  No  such 
mistake  was  made  during  any  of  the  periods  of  high 
prices,  on  the  experience  of  which  [Attwood]  lays 
so  much  stress”  [ 18,  p.  5501.  In  sum,  inflation 
stimulates  activity  only  if  people  are  fooled  into 
believing  that  nominal  gains  are  real.  But  you  can- 
not  fool  all the  people  all  the  time.  Money  illusion  is 
not  permanent.  Therefore  attempts  to  peg  output 
and  employment  at  above-average  levels  are  bound 
to  be  futile.  Inflation  cannot  permanently  stimulate 
economic  activity. 
Costs  and  Benefits  of  Inflation  Contrary  to 
Attwood,  Mill  contended  that  the  costs  of  inflation 
far  exceed  the  benefits.  He  based  his  contention  on 
three  arguments. 
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are  harmful  because  they  put  undue  strain  on  scarce 
resources  and  productive  capacity.  Attwood’s  con- 
cept  of  absolute  full  employment  is  actually  overfull 
and  unsustainabie  employment.  It  implies  a  forced 
draft  economy  in  which  resources  are  used  ineffi- 
ciently  and  workers  are  tricked  into  overexerting 
themselves  under  the  mistaken  belief  that  their  real 
wages  wili  be higher  than  they  actually  prove  to be. A 
reasonable  definition  of  full  employment  would  allow 
for  some  normal  slack  capacity  and  unemployment 
consistent  with  the  inevitable  frictions  and  resource 
realIocations  that  continually  occur  in  a  dynamic 
economy.  As  Xill  put  it, “the  healthy  working  of the 
social  economy  requires,  that,  in  some  channels,  capi- 
tal  should  be  in  full,  while  in  others  it  should  be  in 
slack,  employment”  [ 17,  p.  79 J .  In  other  words. 
some  slack  is  necessary  for  peak  efficiency.  Here 
Mill  was  obviously  identifying  full  employment  with 
what  analysts  now  call  the  natural  rate  of  unemploy- 
ment,  i.e.,  the  rate  that,  given  the  frictions  and  struc- 
tural  characteristics  of  the  economy,  is just  consistent 
with  demand-supply  equilibrium  in  labor  and  prod- 
uct  markets.  Moreover,  he  was  also  specifying  the 
costs  in  terms  of  exertion  and  reduced  efficiency  of 
forcing  activity  to  exceed  its  natural  or  equilibrium 
level. 
Second,  inflation  produces  costly  downward  as well 
as  upward  deviations  from  the  natural  or  equilibrium 
level  of  activity.  Inflationary  booms  breed  corrective 
periods  of  recession-or  “revulsion”  in  Mill’s  words 
--involving  painful  losses  of  output  and  employment. 
These  losses  must  be  taken  into  account  in  any  reck- 
oning  of  the  costs  of  inflation. 
Third,  unanticipated  inflation  has  noneconomic 
social  costs.  People  are  deceived  into  increased  ac- 
tivity.  Contracts  are  unjustly  violated.  Income  and 
wealth  are  arbitrarily  and  unfairly  transferred  from 
creditors  to  debtors  and  from  money  holders  to 
money  issuers.  True,  for  every  loser  there  is  a 
corresponding  winner  so  thai  one  might  conclude 
that  the  net  redistribution  effects  are  zero.  But  this 
argument  would  be  valid  only  “if  integrity  and  good 
faith  were  of  no  importance  to  the  world”  [ 18:  p. 
5521.  fn  a  word,  inflation  is  “a  form  of  robbery”  or 
“a  gigantic  plan  of confiscation”  [ 17, p.  691. 
Rules  Versus  Discretion  On  the  issue  of  rules 
versus  discretion,  Mill  was  diametrically  opposed  to 
Attwood.  Mill  argued  that  a  money  stock  regulated 
by  fixed  rules  has  the  virtues  of  reasonable  predict- 
ability,  stability  of value,  and  freedom  from  alteration 
by  design.  Discretionary  monetary  control,  on  the 
other  hand,  has  certain  inherent  disadvantages.  The 
most  basic  is  that  men  simply  cannot  be  trusted  with 
discretionary  powers.  This  is  particularly  true  of 
“issuers  .  .  .  of  a  government  paper”  who  “always 
have  a  direct  interest  in  lowering  the  value  of  the 
currency,  because  it  is  the  medium  in  which  their 
own  debts  are  computed”  [ 18, p.  5441.  Even  whe:n 
the  monetary  authorities  have  the  best  of  intentions, 
they  are  still  susceptible  to  pressures  to  expand  the 
money  stock  excessively.  “The  temptation  to  over- 
issue,  in  certain  financial  emergencies,  is  so  strong, 
that  nothing  is admissible  which  can  tend,  in however 
slight  a  degree,  to  weaken  the  barriers  that  restrain 
it”  [ lSt  p.  5461.  Being  subject  to alteration  by  design 
or  human  error,  a  discretion-controlled  money  stock 
is  bound  to  be  unpredictable  and  extremely  unstable 
in  value. 
Among  alternative  monetary  arrangements,  MiX 
considered  a  discretionary-controlled  inconvertible 
paper  system  to  be  the  worst  of  the  lot.  There  being 
no automatic  check  to  the  overissue  of  such  currency, 
its  purchasing  power,  he  said,  could  be  depreciated 
“without  limit”  118, p.  3%f.  Much  better  would  be 
an  inconvertible  paper  money  stock  subject  “to  strict 
rules,  one  rule  being  that  whenever  bullion  rose  above 
the  &lint  price,  the  issue  should  be  contracted  until 
the  market  price  of  bullion  and  the  Mint  price  were 
again  in accordance”  [ 18, p.  5451.  Regulated  by  thlc 
price  of  gold,  this  currency  “would  not  be  subject  to 
any  of  the  evils  usually  deemed  inherent  in  an  incon- 
vertible  paper”  [ 18,  p.  5451.  The  trouble  with  this 
rule,  however,  was  that  it  did  not  have  the  public  sup- 
port  necessary  to  enforce  its  rigid  adherence.  The 
gold  standard  did  not  suffer  from  this  defect  and 
therefore  constituted  the  best  monetary  system.  Under 
the  gold  standard,  currency  was  freely  convertible 
into  gold  at a fixed  price.  This  convertibility  rule  \va:j 
definite,  simple,  easily  understood,  and  had  the  strong 
public  support  required  to  enforce  the  authorities’ 
compliance  [ 18,  p.  5461. 
Classical  School’s  View  of  Deflation  The  pre- 
ceding  paragraphs  have  described  J.  S.  Nil’s  viem 
on  (1)  full  employment  versus  convertibility  as 
policy  goals,  (2)  rules  versus  discretion  in  the  con- 
duct  of  monetary  policy,  and  (3)  the  benefits  and 
costs  of  inflation.  Mill  did  not  address  a fourth  issue 
raised  by  Attwood,  namely  the  costs  of  price  defla- 
tion.  But  other  Classical  economists,  including 
Thomas  Malthus,  John  W’heatley,  Robert  Torrens. 
and  above  all,  John  Ramsay  McCulloch,  did  address 
this  very  issue.  Their  position  has  recently  beer. 
summarized  by  Professor  Denis  P.  O’Brien,  himself 
a  leading  authority  on  the  Classical  school.  Accord-, 
ing  to  O’Brien,  the  Classical  economists  “took  from 
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effects  of]  inflation  but  also  a view  that  deflation  had 
the  reverse  effect”  [ 19, p.  1631.  Like  Attwood,  they 
recognized  and  deplored  the  painful  effects  of  defla- 
tion  on  output  and  employment. 
They  too  were  strongly  opposed  to  deflation;  they 
saw  the  hardship  that  this  could  produce  and  they 
saw  too  that  increases  in  the  money  supply  could 
offset  this  hardship  and  raise  the  level  of  activity. 
But  they  believed  that  Attwood’s  inflationism,  con- 
taining  within  itself  the  dangers  of  hyperinflation 
had  the  potentiality  of  producing,  through  the 
‘d&truction  of  not  only  convertibility  but  the  cur- 
rency  itself,  far  more  suffering  even  than  was  en- 
g$htrin  bouts  . of  deflation  under  convertibility. 
their  approach  was  to  try  to  make  a 
convertible  ‘system  work  more  gently  [19,  p.  1651. 
In  other  words,  the  Classical  economists  thought  that 
the  costs  of  accepting  inflation  exceeded  the  costs  of 
eliminating  it. 
The  Current  Debate  The  Attwood-Mill  debate 
ended  with  the  mid-nineteenth  century  Australian 
and  Californian  gold  discoveries  that  provided  the 
monetary  expansion  long  sought  by  proponents  of  a 
paper  standard.  But  the  issues  and  viewpoints  of the 
debate  survive  and  flourish  to  this  very  day,  as  Karl 
Brunner’s  recent  Congressional  testimony  confirms 
[131- 
According  to  Brunner,  present-day  policy  activists 
stress  the  persistent  slack  in  resource  utilization  and 
urge  speedy  recovery  facilitated  by  rapid  monetary 
growth.  Moreover  they  argue  that  continuous  fine- 
tuning  is  needed  to  maintain  full  employment  in  the 
face  of  autonomous  shocks.  To  this  end  they  contend 
that  money  growth  should  be  rapidly  adjusted  to  the 
shifting  state  of  the  economy.  Finally,  they  are  will- 
ing  to  tolerate  inherited  inflation  on  at  least  three 
grounds.  First,  the  unemployment  costs  of  fighting 
inflation  are  too  high  to  make  anti-inflationary  policy 
feasible.  Second,  inflation,  if  unanticipated,  will 
exert  a beneficial  stimulus  to  output  and  employment. 
Third,  if the  inflation  is fully  anticipated  it will  have 
no  permanent  effect  on  resource  allocation  or  income 
distribution  and  so  will  be  virtually  painless.  Thus 
at  best  inflation  is beneficial,  and  at  worst  it  is harm- 
less.  On  the  basis  of  this  cost-benefit  calculus,  acti- 
vists  conclude  that  a  policy  of  accepting  inflation  is 
superior  to  one  of  combating  it.  All  this  is  very 
reminiscent  of  Thomas  Attwood’s  analysis. 
On  the  other  side  of  the  debate,  arguments  similar 
to  those  of  John  Stuart  Mill  and  the  Classical  school 
are  still  very  much  in  force.  Like  Mill,  current  pro- 
ponents  of  stable  monetary  growth  argue  that  acti- 
vists  tend  to  overestimate  the  amount  of  slack  ca- 
pacity  existing  in  the  economy  and  underestimate  the 
economy’s  ability  to  generate  high  average  levels  of 
employment  v,-hen  undisturbed  by  monetary  shocks. 
Like  Mill,  they  believe  that  attempts  to  peg  unem- 
ployment  at  arbitrarily  low  levels  through  moneta?y  *” 
management  are  futile  and  counterproductive,.  Like 
him  they  maintain  that  economic  acti$y  liourishes 
best  in  an  environment  of  price  stzlility.  For  this 
reason  they  assign  top  o&ri;y  to  moving  to  a  zero 
target  rate  of  infIa:icnGven  if  it  means  slowing  the 
pace  of  the  recovery  during  the  transition.  More- 
over,  like  &&ill,  they  advocate  rules  rather  than  dis- 
cretion  in  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy.  The  rule 
they  prescribe  calls  for  a  constant  rate  of  money 
growth  equal  to  the  trend  growth  rate  of  output. 
This  rule  is  consistent  with  full  capacity  utilization 
and  the  zero  target  rate  of  inflation. 
Finally,  just  as  the  Classical  school  agreed  with 
Attwood  on  the  adverse  side  effects  of  deflation,  so 
do  stable  money  proponents  concur  with  activists  on 
the  costs  of  removing  inflation.  In  fact,  the  reason 
they  propose  a  gradual  descent  to  a  zero  inflation 
target  is  to  minimize  the  unemployment  costs  during 
the  transition.  What  they  dispute  is  the  activists’ 
estimate  of  the  costs  of  accepting  inherited  inflation. 
They  believe  the  activists  seriously  underestimate 
these  costs.  They  contend  that  any  publicly- 
announced  willingness  to  accommodate  inherited  in- 
flation  will  lead  to  accelerating  and  highly  erratic 
(variabIe)  inflation  involving  great  social  harm.  Not 
only  will  there  be  repeated  falls  in  output  and  em- 
ployment  whenever  the  inflation  rate  drops,  but  the 
very  unpredictability  of volatile  inflation  will  increase 
business  uncertainty,  will  make  capital  investment 
decisions  riskier,  will  divert  energies  and  skills  from 
industry  to  speculation,  and  will  reduce  the  informa- 
tion  content  of  market  prices  thereby  making  the 
price  system  a  less  efficient  mechanism  for  coordi- 
nating  economic  activity.  The  end  result  will  be 
slower  economic  growth,  lower  productivity,  and 
higher  average  unemployment.  Mill  would  have 
agreed  comp’!e?ely  with  this  diagnosis. 
Conclusion  Ii  the  foregoing  is  at  all  an  accurate 
account  of  the  current  debate  then  it  follows  that  the 
roots  of  that  debate  lie  in  the  earlier  Attwood-Mill 
controversy.  That  the  issues  and  arguments  of  an 
ancient  controversy  would  survive  virtually  intact  to 
form  the  core  of a key  policy  debate  almost  150 years 
later  is  indeed  a  remarkable  fact.  At  feast  three 
conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  this  fact.  First, 
modern  economists,  for  all  their  sophisticated  econo- 
metric  modds  and  high-speed  computers,  have  ad- 
vanced  little  beyond  their  nineteenth  century  prede- 
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and  control  of  inflation  and  unemployment.  Second, 
neither  side  has  yet  convinced  the  other,  otherwise 
the  debate  would  have  long  since  been  laid  to  rest. 
In  other  words,  neither  side  has  been  proven  con- 
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Fifth  District  farmers  demand  for  credit  was  unusually  strong  in  the  second  quarter  of  1977. 
Supplies  of  loanable  funds  at  commercial  banks  were  generally  ample.  however.  although  not  as 
much  so  as  in  other  recent  Jx-zriotls.  Loan-to-deposit  ratios  oi  I)articipating  h:?nks  were  hi&q.  but 
Ioan  referral  activity  continued  to  be  weak.  Some  loan  repaylxent  problems  were  preva!ent  in  areas 
hit  hard  by  droughtt  and  loan  renewals  or  extensions  i\:cre  greater  in  some  of  these  areas.  These 
are  some  of  the  more  significant  findings  of  the  Quarterly  Survey  of  Agricuiturnl  Credit  Conditions 
conducted  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond  for  the  second  quarter  of  1977.  The  complete 
report  is  available  in  mimeographed  form.  Copies  ~;:a?;  be  ol)tninetl  by  writing  to  the  Research 
Department,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Kichmond,  P.  0.  Box  27622.  :Kichmond,  Virginia  23261. 
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